Mexico and US: Unlikely Allies Against Cartels?

Person speaking at podium beside Mexican flag

Washington is sending $1.5 million to train Mexican prosecutors even as the public is being told that the cartels still control large parts of Mexico—and that past U.S.-funded efforts like this have already failed.

Story Snapshot

The U.S. committed $1.5 million for a Mexican law-enforcement partnership aimed at training prosecutors to prepare charges that meet criminal-law standards.
The investment lands amid intensified U.S.-Mexico security cooperation after the February 22, 2026 killing of CJNG leader Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes with CIA intelligence support.
Mexico under President Claudia Sheinbaum has expanded intelligence sharing and accepted higher levels of coordination than under former President López Obrador.
Analysts caution that headline cartel takedowns do not automatically translate into lasting security gains without institutional follow-through and financial targeting of cartel networks.

A Small Price Tag With Big Expectations at the Border

The U.S. funding package totals $1.5 million and is described as support for a partnership program focused on training Mexican prosecutors to prepare criminal charges consistent with legal standards. That narrow focus matters: prosecutors who cannot build viable cases often watch dangerous suspects walk, fueling impunity and corruption risks. Public reporting also notes a key complication—similar capacity-building projects have failed before—yet the available details do not specify which projects, when they collapsed, or what metrics proved them ineffective.

This new spending arrives inside a bigger, faster-moving security relationship that has political consequences on both sides of the border. For Americans who have watched fentanyl deaths soar and illegal border crossings strain communities, a “training program” can sound like another round of foreign aid with uncertain payoff. The central question is accountability: whether the partnership is tied to measurable performance—charge quality, conviction rates, and dismantled networks—rather than well-meaning seminars that disappear once funding dries up.

El Mencho’s Death Shows Tactical Reach—Not Automatic Control

On February 22, 2026, elite Mexican special operations forces, acting on CIA intelligence, killed El Mencho, the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, widely described as Mexico’s most powerful criminal organization. The operation marked one of Mexico’s most significant tactical successes since the 2016 rearrest of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. Yet reporting also indicates the aftermath has been disappointing in terms of immediately degrading CJNG capability, underscoring how resilient cartel structures can be.

President Trump publicly used the moment to press Mexico for sustained action, warning that cartel control remains widespread despite the headline victory. Mexico’s security crisis, as described, spans multiple states, with CJNG reach extending from Jalisco to Chiapas near the Guatemalan border. The cartel’s track record includes high-casualty attacks and assassination attempts against senior officials. A leadership decapitation can change the board, but it does not automatically remove the players.

Sheinbaum’s Cooperation With Washington Expands the Tools on the Table

Mexico’s posture toward U.S. cooperation has shifted under President Claudia Sheinbaum. It indicates she has been more cooperative with Washington on counter-drug efforts than López Obrador, while still stating that U.S. troops will not be allowed to conduct unilateral offensive operations inside Mexico. At the same time, the Sheinbaum administration has expanded CIA aerial surveillance over cartel-heavy areas and increased information sharing between the two governments, signaling a higher-operational tempo than prior years.

Mexico has also transferred more than 90 high-level drug traffickers to U.S. custody for prosecution, including Rafael Caro Quintero and El Mencho’s brother. That kind of cooperation may appeal to Americans who want results rather than rhetoric, because U.S. prosecutions can reduce the chances that powerful defendants exploit local intimidation or compromised institutions. Still, extraditions and transfers are not a full strategy by themselves; they work best when paired with institutional reforms that keep cases from collapsing at home.

Follow the Money: Financial Cooperation Is the Missing Multiplier

Another track is emerging alongside raids and arrests: financial targeting. In January 2026, Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit co-hosted the first meeting of a new Transnational Organized Crime Working Group with the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Analysts argue that durable reductions in drug flows depend on disrupting the financial lifelines that let cartels recruit, buy weapons, corrupt officials, and replace lost leadership. Without financial pressure, tactical wins can become temporary headlines.

It points to institutional constraints that can blunt financial crackdowns, including resource limitations and a need for structural reforms inside Mexico’s financial enforcement bodies. That context matters for U.S. taxpayers: a $1.5 million prosecutor-training program may be worthwhile, but it is unlikely to stand alone as the decisive factor. If Washington wants fewer drugs and less cartel influence bleeding toward the U.S. border, the pressure has to be consistent, measurable, and tied to outcomes that cartels cannot easily reconstitute.

What Conservatives Should Watch Next: Results, Conditions, and Sovereignty Lines

Three practical indicators will show whether this partnership is more than symbolism: whether trained prosecutors produce stronger, court-ready cases; whether Mexico sustains operational coordination beyond a single high-profile takedown; and whether financial cooperation leads to real asset seizures and disrupted networks. It also flags a notable limitation: the “prior failed projects” reference lacks specifics, making it difficult for the public to judge what went wrong and what safeguards are now in place.

For Americans focused on border security, constitutional order, and public safety, the core standard is simple: U.S. engagement should reduce cartel power that fuels illegal trafficking and drug deaths, not expand vague commitments with no enforcement teeth. The Trump administration’s leverage over Mexico has been described as significant, but leverage only matters if it is used to demand transparency, benchmarks, and sustained cooperation. Otherwise, this becomes another spend-now, explain-later program that fails the people it’s supposed to protect.